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Abstract
Helicopter final assembly involves the installation of hundreds of components into the aircraft and takes
thousands of man-hours. Meeting production targets such as total build days and total aircraft man-
hours can be difficult when faced with challenges related to parts, workforce, and scheduling. A tool to
identify key installations on which to focus efforts for maximum benefit can help improve performance to
targets.
The Critical Path Method was developed as a project management tool to aid in scheduling large and
complex projects. Its application to manufacturing can provide the insights necessary to improve
performance in an environment such as helicopter final assembly.
This thesis provides a case study of helicopter final assembly. A critical path analysis is performed on the
assembly process, using predecessor, duration, and resource data. The results of the analysis are used to
draw conclusions about the system as a whole and to make recommendations to improve system
performance.
Thesis Supervisor: Roy Welsch
Title: Eastman Kodak Leaders for Global Operations Professor of Management
Thesis Supervisor: Daniel Whitney
Title: Senior Lecturer, Engineering Systems Division
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1. Introduction
This thesis is based on an internship which took place at Sikorsky Aircraft's Florida Assembly and Flight
Operations (FAFO) facility in West Palm Beach, Florida from June through December 2011. The
purpose of the internship was to perform a critical path analysis of the final assembly process for one
production line at the FAFO facility.
Chapter 2 provides background information to put the problem statement, analysis, results, and
conclusions into context. Chapter 3 introduces some of the challenges in the final assembly process and
the motivation behind a critical path analysis. Chapter 4 contains a review of relevant literature on the
topic of the critical path method. Chapter 5 details the approach taken in this project and presents the
general results of the analysis. Chapter 6 draws conclusions and provides recommendations based on the
critical path analysis. In addition, chapter 6 identifies some areas for further study.
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2. Background
This chapter provides background information necessary for understanding the project statement and
results. Section 2.1 introduces the Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation; Section 2.2 describes the facility where
the project was located; Section 2.3 details the basics of helicopter final assembly; and Section 2.4
discusses two different assembly methodologies.
2.1 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, a division of United Technologies Corporation (UTC; Public, NYSE:
UTX), is a leading manufacturer of commercial and military rotorcraft. The company was founded by
Igor Sikorsky in 1925 in New York, later moving to Stratford, Connecticut and becoming part of what
would become United Technologies Corporation. Sikorsky is headquartered in Stratford, CT and
employs 17,780 people worldwide (About Sikorsky, 2012; UTC, 2011). Sikorsky contributed $7.36
billion in net sales to UTC in 2011; UTC's net sales totaled $58.2 billion in 2011 (see Figure 1; UTC,
2011
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Figure 1. UTC Net Sales by Business Unit, 2011
Sikorsky has three businesses: Sikorsky Military Systems, Sikorsky Global Helicopters, and Sikorsky
Aerospace Services. Sikorsky Military Systems manufactures military helicopters for the United States
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armed forces as well as for select foreign military. Examples include the BLACK HAWK, presidential
transport helicopters, and the CH-53 family of heavy-lift helicopters. Sikorsky Global Helicopters
manufactures civil and government helicopters used for various purposes including offshore oil transport
and search and rescue. Sikorsky Aerospace Services is the service arm of Sikorsky (About Sikorsky,
2012).
2.2 Florida Assembly and Flight Operations
Sikorsky Military Systems (SMS) has three final assembly sites in the United States. This thesis focuses
on the Florida Assembly and Flight Operations (FAFO) facility in West Palm Beach, Florida. The FAFO
facility is located on the same site as a Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne facility and the Sikorsky
Developmental Flight Center. FAFO was opened in February 2008 to increase Sikorsky's capacity to
build military aircraft. The success of the facility led to increased production, reaching 145% of the 2009
level in 2011 (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. FAFO Production, 2008 to 2011
A variety of military helicopters are assembled at FAFO. At the time of this internship, there were
approximately five different products being assembled at FAFO, each on its own production line. In
2011, the FAFO facility assembled 24% of the total aircraft produced by SMS.
Final Assembly is the final stage in the manufacture of a helicopter. During final assembly,
subassemblies and other components are installed into the airframe. These parts come from internal and
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external suppliers around the world. Quality checks and operational checks are performed as assembly
progresses.
In addition to final assembly operations, flight operations are also conducted at FAFO. These are
necessary steps completed before the final sale of the aircraft. Flight operations include painting and
fueling of the aircraft, performing a ground run to ensure proper operation of aircraft systems prior to
flight, and passing flight acceptance tests flown by both Sikorsky and customer pilots.
2.3 Helicopter Final Assembly
Final assembly begins with receipt of the airframe. The airframe is the basic fuselage structure of the
aircraft and is constructed of sheet metal or, in some cases, composite materials. During final assembly,
subassemblies and other components are installed into the airframe. Systems installed include the wiring,
tail rotor pylon, exhaust systems, engines, transmission, oil cooler, control systems, and avionics. The
final assembly build is comprised of hundreds of installations to install these systems into the helicopter.
Each installation is called an AOS (Assembly Operation Sequence). Each AOS consists of many
operations that must be followed to ensure proper assembly of the helicopter. These include quality
checks performed by the Quality Assurance (QA) department. If there is a problem with the installation
of a component, QA inspectors record the problem, and it must be fixed before that operation can be
completed and signed off.
QA inspectors also perform detailed inspections of the entire aircraft after assembly is completed. These
comprehensive inspections are called shakes. As shown in Figure 3, there are two QA shakes performed
after the aircraft is built: Final Assembly Shake and Hangar Shake. Final assembly inspectors perform
the Final Assembly Shake to ensure the aircraft has been properly built, and inspectors from flight
operations (the "hangar") perform Hangar Shake to verify that the aircraft has been properly built before
it is transferred to the hangar. Discrepancies found during the shake process must be fixed before the
shake can be completed.
Some AOSs are tests to ensure the systems installed during final assembly are functioning properly.
These AOSs are called ATPs (Assembly Test Procedures). The last major ATP performed is the Water
Test ATP which is completed after both shakes are performed but before the aircraft is delivered to flight
operations (see Figure 3). Since the military helicopters that Sikorsky builds fly in extreme weather
conditions, the water test ATP ensures that each helicopter is watertight, i.e. there are no leaks from the
exterior of the aircraft to the interior.
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Another set of checks is in place to verify the build process of each helicopter. The Defense Contractor
Management Agency (DCMA) is a government body that works directly with government suppliers to
ensure products and services are delivered as promised. DCMA employees at Sikorsky perform checks at
various points in the final assembly process to guarantee the helicopters are being built to the correct
specifications.
Internship focus
* 0 I. * U *
Figure 3. Simplified Helicopter Final Assembly Process
The focus of this thesis is the "Build and Test Aircraft" phase of the Final Assembly process as shown in
Figure 3. Included in this phase is the completion of almost all AOSs and ATPs and most of the QA and
DCMA verification steps.
2.4 Assembly Methodologies
There are two build methodologies that manufacturers use when assembling a large product in relatively
low volumes such as an aircraft. The first methodology is the Position Build, shown in Figure 4. To aid
in explanation, assume that final assembly for a helicopter comprises six positions. (This is a theoretical
number and is not based on Sikorsky's actual build process.) Ideally, the six positions would physically
be located in a line or in a U-shape to facilitate flow from one position to the next. Follow aircraft 1
through the build process. The aircraft starts in position 6 (or position N, where N is the total number of
positions). AOSs have been assigned to each position based on past industrial engineering studies. All
AOSs assigned to position 6 will be completed in a time less than or equal to the takt time of the line; in
this case, assume the takt time is 6 days. (Again, this is a theoretical number and is not based on
Sikorsky's build process.) After 6 days have progressed and the AOSs for position 6 are complete,
aircraft 1 rolls to position 5. A new airframe is received and is placed in position 6 (aircraft 2). Another 6
days progress, the position 5 AOSs for aircraft 1 are complete, and the position 6 AOSs for aircraft 2 are
complete. The line rolls again. This process repeats until 36 days (N x takt time) have passed. At this
point, aircraft 1 is complete, and aircraft 2 through 7 are in process.
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Figure 4. Theoretical Six-Position Helicopter Build with Takt Time of 6 days
The Position Build methodology keeps resources in one position and moves the aircraft from position to
position. A mechanic named Johnny will complete Mechanical Install A in position 6 on each aircraft.
Since he is repeating the installation every 6 days (the takt time), he will develop expertise doing this
installation and will progress along the learning curve. Materials handler Jeremy will always deliver the
parts for Mechanical Install A to Johnny in position 6. Similarly, the aircraft will always roll off the line
from position 1, from the same location on the factory floor. In the Position Build, the product moves
from position-to-position, and the resources (people, parts, and auxiliary equipment) stay in one position.
The second methodology is the Battleship Build. When performing a Battleship Build, the physical
product - in this case, the aircraft - stays in one location for the duration of the final assembly process.
Using the parameters introduced above, assume it takes 36 days for Sikorsky to assemble an aircraft. On
day one, the airframe would be delivered to a specified location in the facility. For the next 36 days,
people, parts, and auxiliary equipment would flow to the product as needed. At other specific locations
throughout the facility, additional aircraft would be in various stages of completion. At the end of 36
days, when the aircraft is complete, it would roll off the line from wherever it is located.
There are two ways to approach resource allocation with the Battleship Build. The first way mimics the
logistics of the Position Build. One day, an associate named Johnny performs Mechanical Install A on
aircraft 1 in one location. Six days later, Johnny performs Mechanical Install A on aircraft 2 in another
location. In another six days, Johnny will be performing Mechanical Install A on aircraft 3 in a third
location. Allocating resources in this manner takes advantage of the learning curve introduced in the
Position Build discussion, but it requires people to work in many different locations in the factory. This
constant movement of resources can be confusing. The second way to approach resource allocation does
not take advantage of specialization. Johnny performs Mechanical Installs A, B, C, and D on aircraft 1 in
one location. Jenny performs Mechanical Installs A, B, C, and D on aircraft 2 in another location.
Neither mechanic has to move between aircraft, but both mechanics need broader knowledge to perform
multiple installations. Now, each mechanic only performs the installation once every 36 days, slowing
his movement along the learning curve.
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The production line on which this thesis focuses follows the Position Build methodology. There are
aircraft being built at FAFO that followed the Battleship Build methodology, but these models are
demanded in much lower quantity and are usually built one-at-a-time.
As mentioned, each position has certain AOSs assigned to it. The AOSs were assigned based on
knowledge of the overall final assembly process. For example, the wiring must be installed before the
avionics can be installed and operational checks performed; therefore, the wiring would be assigned to an
earlier position and the avionics installation and the associated operational checks assigned to a later
position or a later time slot at the same position. In addition, each AOS has associated target hours. The
target hours predict how long it should take to complete the AOS, on average. Industrial engineers
developed the target hours based on limited study of the installations. Detailed time studies were not
completed.
This chapter has provided the background information necessary to understand the motivation behind this
project. A part of UTC, Sikorsky is a leading manufacturer of commercial and military helicopters. This
internship focused on final assembly on one production line at the FAFO facility. On that production
line, the assembly methodology of Position Build is employed.
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3. Problem Statement
Chapter 3 introduces the project's problem statement. Section 3.1 presents the challenges that FAFO
final assembly faces and the consequences of these challenges. Section 3.2 discusses the motivation
behind a critical path analysis.
3.1 Final Assembly Challenges
Section 2.4 describes how final assembly is done in an ideal aircraft factory. Every real facility will face
challenges when trying to follow the ideal process. The challenges faced at the FAFO facility relate to
parts, hourly and salaried workforce, and scheduling and result in carry-forward work, increased aircraft
hours, and increased total build days.
Parts
A part is needed on the floor on the day that corresponds with its installation. Sufficient time is necessary
for the parts to be received and processed by materials handling before needed on the floor; at FAFO, this
time is approximately 48 hours. For example, if the engines are installed on day 15, then the engines are
required on day 15. However, materials handling will have received the engines 48 hours previous. Also,
parts can be pulled from the parts crib up to 24 hours before they are needed for installation. If a part is
not available, the installation cannot be completed. Usually, the associates continue with the aircraft
build, completing installs that are not dependent on the part shortage. Sometimes, the associates
undertake installations with the knowledge that the work will have to be redone when the part is received.
This second behavior occurs since associates want to appear busy and supervisors want to keep associates
busy.
At FAFO, every aircraft has many part shortages. Parts are received late to the FAFO facility due to late
supplier deliveries, increased production rates, and FAFO's distance from Sikorsky's third-party logistics
(3PL) provider. The former two reasons cause the parts to be late, and the latter circumstance exacerbates
the problem. Suppliers will experience problems meeting schedule, just as Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEMs) will. In addition, Sikorsky has increased the production rate over the past few
years (or equivalently decreased target aircraft build days, see Figure 5). This puts added pressure on the
suppliers to keep pace. FAFO's location makes late parts even later. Sikorsky uses a 3PL provider to
handle parts inventory. The other SMS final assembly facilities are less than 6 hours by truck from the
3PL provider. In fact, the main assembly site, collocated with Sikorsky headquarters in Stratford,
Connecticut, is less than thirty minutes away from the 3PL provider. FAFO, on the other hand, is three
days away by truck. This distance puts FAFO at a large disadvantage relative to the other locations. If all
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three locations are delayed due to a part shortage and have the same delivery date, FAFO will receive the
part in three days instead of 6 hours and will automatically be that much farther behind in the build
process. In addition, hours would have been building up on the aircraft while waiting for the part (if it
was holding up other installations), and employees would have been trying to perform workarounds.
120%
8 100%
80% -
4!
60% -
40%
S20%
0%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Figure 5. Aircraft Total Build Days, 2008 to 2012
Hourly Workforce
The FAFO hourly workforce is unionized and consists of the leads and associates. The leads work only
part of the time as direct labor, applying their hours directly to the aircraft build. The rest of the time,
they charge "Shop Supervision" and provide help and guidance for the associates. The ratio of direct
labor hours to indirect labor hours for a lead varies from 4:4 to 0:8 for an 8-hour day. Currently, there is
approximately one mechanical and one electrical lead per position, and usually one hydraulics lead for an
entire production line. (There are relatively fewer hydraulics AOSs compared with mechanical and
electrical AOSs.)
At FAFO, hourly employees are not required to belong to the union, but almost everyone does. Disputes
with the company, known as grievances, occur on an individual level over actions deemed as inconsistent
with the union contract. For example, hourly employees are categorized into different labor grades,
depending on their experience. A higher labor grade corresponds to more time with the company and an
increased hourly wage. If an associate feels like he has been doing work above his labor grade for 50% or
more of his time over the last 90 days, he has the right to be paid at that higher labor grade. To
complicate the situation, the AOSs aren't categorized by labor grade, so there is a degree of subjectivity
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in the assessment of what labor grade of work an associate has been performing. Because of these
uncertainties, a grievance over labor grade may be difficult to resolve. Union stewards represent the
hourly associate in these matters and argue on his behalf.
When the FAFO facility first opened, 96 employees were transferred from the Developmental Flight
Center, and 90 additional employees were hired within 30 days. Due to the quick ramp-up, employees'
experience varies greatly. Some associates had years of relative experience as a mechanic or electrician
prior to joining Sikorsky. Others had no relevant experience, coming from Starbucks, for example. In
addition to hiring, some employees transferred from Stratford. Although this allowed FAFO to start with
a more experienced workforce, the transferred employees influenced the culture of the new facility.
FAFO was not able to develop its own culture, and negative aspects of the Stratford union culture were
transplanted to FAFO. FAFO currently has approximately 600 employees; the additional employees were
added over a period of 18 months.
During the second half of 2011, there was some movement of hourly leads and associates between
production lines. One program was delayed, and leads and associates were temporarily transferred to
other production lines. This had two main effects. First, it introduced more hourly employees than were
needed on some lines which drove up aircraft hours. Second, the transferred employees were unfamiliar
with the new aircraft and its installations; this unfamiliarity led to increased time to perform AOSs which
also led to increased aircraft hours.
The planning function at Sikorsky plans the overall hourly workforce on an aggregate basis. Breakdown
of the workforce into specialties (mechanics, electricians, plumbers, electrical checkout) is not
considered. Consequently, some production lines are unbalanced. The line studied had too many
electricians and not enough mechanics, but the process to switch an associate from an electrician to a
mechanic is difficult and requires the willingness of the associate. From time to time, it is possible to
borrow mechanics from other lines, but only when the other lines can spare mechanics. Borrowing also
introduces the issue of possible unfamiliarity with the AOSs, driving up aircraft hours.
Salaried Workforce
For each program, the salaried production workforce consists of supervisors, line managers, and an
operations manager as shown in Figure 6. FAFO currently works three shifts; first shift is from 6:00 AM
to 2:30 PM, second shift is from 3:00 PM to 11:30 PM, and third shift is from 11:30 PM to 6:00 AM the
following day. Each shift includes a 30-minute lunch break. First and second shifts are of approximately
equal size. Third shift is substantially smaller. Figure 6 represents the number of supervisors in mid-
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2011. Each supervisor had responsibility for 2 positions, on average. There was only one third shift
supervisor due to the size of the third shift crew. In the third quarter of 2011, extra supervisors were
hired, and currently, there is one supervisor per position. FAFO supervisors are responsible for 20
employees, on average. (There remains only one supervisor on third shift for all positions.) Similarly,
there was one mechanical and one electrical lead for two positions, but there is currently one lead of each
specialty per position.
Salaried
Hourly
Figure 6. Typical Production Organizational Structure
This trend of increasing the number of supervisors and leads seems beneficial. Unfortunately, FAFO is at
a disadvantage because of the set-up of the production line. To build the same helicopter, the Stratford
facility has twice as many positions. For example, assuming FAFO follows the theoretical six-position
build in Figure 4, Stratford would have twelve positions to build the same aircraft. Each position would
perform half the work of a FAFO position. Thus, Stratford positions 1 and 2 would correspond to FAFO
position 1. Stratford also has one supervisor, one mechanical lead, and one electrical lead per position.
Since there are twice as many positions as at FAFO, each Stratford supervisor and set of leads is
responsible for roughly 15 employees and half as many AOSs. This allows the supervisors and leads
more time per employee and per AOS. Also, with more employees and AOSs per position as at FAFO,
there can be issues of crowding in the aircraft's limited space.
Figure 6 shows the production organizational structure. FAFO also has support functions: quality,
materials handling, industrial engineering, manufacturing engineering, planning, finance, and safety/lean
manufacturing. Some of these functions report up to the FAFO facility director, and some of them report
directly to functional heads at headquarters. The industrial engineers are an example of a function that
reports directly to headquarters and has limited dotted-line reporting to the FAFO facility director.
Actually, for the helicopter program studied, there was only one industrial engineer (IE) for three
25
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different production lines (three different models from one program). He was overwhelmed completing
required daily reports and did not have time to perform actual IE functions. Consequently, supervisors
had to extract data from the labor-reporting system, analyze the data, and initiate and implement process
improvements without support from the IE department.
Scheduling
Target hours exist for each AOS. The target hours are the number of hours it should take, on average, to
complete a given AOS. For example, Mechanical Install A may have a target of 8 hours. This means it
should take one mechanic 8 hours to perform this AOS. Most AOSs can be completed by one person;
however, if two mechanics are necessary, the amount of time per mechanic decreases. The total amount
of time to complete the AOS (mechanic 1's hours + mechanic 2's hours) should be no more than the
target, in this case, 8 hours.
As with the assignment of AOSs to positions (see Chapter 2), the assignment of target hours to each AOS
is based on IE estimates and on tribal knowledge not on detailed time studies. The target hours are
determined in Stratford and are passed down to satellite locations. At FAFO, these targets are called
"Stratford target hours." Since the FAFO employees have less experience on average than the Stratford
employees, FAFO is budgeted more total hours to complete an aircraft. Over time, as FAFO employees
gain more experience, the FAFO transfer cost (total aircraft hours) approaches the Stratford transfer cost
(see Figure 7). Using a ratio of the FAFO transfer cost to the Stratford transfer cost, a set of "adjusted
FAFO target hours" can be calculated. For example, if Electrical Install A has a target of 8 hours at
Stratford, its target at FAFO might be 10 hours (8 hours x 1.25, assuming 1.25 is the ratio of FAFO
transfer cost to Stratford transfer cost). There has been confusion among supervisors, upper management,
and lEs regarding which target hours should be used for standard reports and informal performance
evaluations. The operations manager strongly favored using adjusted FAFO target hours while the lEs
favored using Stratford target hours. Supervisors were using Stratford target hours. During the
internship, this changed, and all parties started using adjusted FAFO target hours.
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Figure 7. Aircraft Transfer Cost, 2008 to 2012
A consulting study was being completed during the first half of the internship. Sikorsky had hired a
consulting firm (hypothetically called Acme Consulting) to study the breakdown of the aircraft build into
AOSs. Before the study, target hours per AOS ranged from 96 hours down to 1 hour, depending on the
installation. Acme recommended that the AOSs with higher target hours be broken down into 8-hour
increments; therefore, one associate should complete one AOS every day, on average. For example,
Mechanical Install took 24 hours prior to the Acme changes. After the Acme changes, there were three
installs (Mechanical Installs A, B, and C), and each had a target of 8 hours. Acme's logic was that this
would create a clear definition of each employee's scope of work every day. In theory, this
decomposition of the larger AOSs makes sense. Unfortunately, when implemented, the Acme changes
did not have a great effect at FAFO. Often, the AOSs were improperly decomposed: operations were
ordered incorrectly in the resulting AOSs. This, as well as a widespread mentality to oppose change, led
employees to perform the AOSs in the exact same manner as before the Acme changes.
For example, in the Control Install AOS, Jimmy installs three sets of the same equipment. For each set of
equipment, there are preparation steps, installation steps, and completion steps. Before the Acme
changes, although a specific order of operations was documented in the AOS, Jimmy performed the steps
for each set of equipment as he wished. He prepped all sets of equipment together then installed all sets
of equipment and finally completed all sets of equipment. Now, Control Install has been decomposed
into Control Installs A, B, and C. Control Install A comprises the preparation, installation, and
completion of equipment set 1. Similarly, Control Installs B and C comprise the preparation, installation,
and completion of equipment sets 2 and 3, respectively. Instead of readjusting his work methods, Jimmy
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continues to complete all preparation steps first then all installation steps and finally all completion steps.
Instead of completing one AOS each day, he works on them simultaneously, completing all three AOSs
after three days. Although the results are the same, the perceived benefits of the Acme changes have been
lost. (Also, it is difficult to correctly assign labor hours to each AOS when performed in this manner.
See Chapter 5 for details of this situation.)
There is a visual tool, a balance chart, that can be used to help manage the completion of AOSs. The
balance chart was developed in Stratford and details which AOSs should be completed each day in each
position. The balance chart also breaks down the work by specialty. Figure 8 shows a hypothetical
balance chart. The balance chart should be displayed at each position, and completed AOSs are colored
in to signify completion (see Figure 9). When correctly implemented, the balance chart allows someone
to quickly evaluate how well the position is performing to schedule. In reality, the balance chart was
rarely used at FAFO. The balance charts available were developed using the standard (Stratford) target
hours and represented the ideal manpower allocation. During Q4 of 2011, a supervisor was trying to
develop a FAFO-specific balance chart in his spare time.
Table 1. Balance Chart, Days 1 & 2 of Position 6
POSITION 6 DAY ONE DAY TWO
Mechanic 1 RV ACCE LH FAIRING INSTALL (8 hours) RH FAIRING INSTALL (4 hours) SEAL INS)LL (2DOOR (2 hours) I hus
Mechanic 2 FUEL CELL ENCLOSURE INSTALL A (8 hours) FUEL CELL ENCLOSURE INSTALL B (8 hours)
Mechanic 3 CONTROL INSTALL A (8 hours) CONTROL INSTALL B (8 hours)
Mechanic 4 COVER INSTALL (4 hours) LH QUAD ASSEMBLY INSTALL (8 hours) 1st of RH QUAD ASSEMBLY
Electrician 1 TUB PREPERATION A (8 hours) TUB PREPERATION B (8 hours)
ElectricIan 2 TOP DECK WIRING A (8 hours) TOP DECK WIRING B (8 hours)
Plumber 1 MANIFOLD INSTALL A (8 hours) MANIFOLD INSTALL B (8 hours)
Table 2. Completed Balance Chart, Days 1 & 2 of Position 6
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Despite the available tools, there was widespread failure to meet target AOS hours at FAFO. As
mentioned previously, this was due, in part, to a confusion about which hours to use as targets: Stratford
target hours or FAFO adjusted target hours. Supervisors, leads, associates, and the IE were using
Stratford target hours, and management thought they were using FAFO adjusted target hours. During the
internship this inconsistency was rectified; everyone began using FAFO adjusted target hours. Part
shortages and manpower shortages also led to overruns on AOS hours. In addition, the lack of motivation
and accountability discussed previously exacerbated the failure to meet targets.
Every year since FAFO opened, the total number of aircraft produced at the facility has increased (see
Figure 2). At the same time, target aircraft total build days and aircraft total hours (transfer cost) have
decreased (see Figures 5 and 7). This scheduling has put added pressure on FAFO employees. FAFO has
seen vast improvements due to learning (see Figure 8), but the facility continually faces pressure to
improve.
Figure 8. FAFO Average Total Hours and Transfer Cost, 2008 to 2012
In addition to annual production targets, there are also monthly and quarterly production targets.
Inevitably, production lags behind the schedule until a few weeks before the end of a period when
management makes a huge push to complete all the scheduled aircraft. Priorities are reshuffled, and all
resources needed on the front aircraft are pulled from other aircraft to push the priority aircraft through
production. An example of this is illustrated in Figure 9 with two aircraft scheduled for delivery in the
first quarter and four aircraft scheduled for delivery in the second quarter. As one might expect, this
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behavior creates a self-reinforcing cycle. In the example shown in Figure 9, the back four aircraft now
have fewer resources and will fall even farther behind the schedule. Next quarter, resources will have to
be pulled forward to complete these aircraft on time, causing the new aircraft in the back of the line to fall
behind once again.
11 echanics
Plumbers
Figure 9. Flow of Resources to Priority Aircraft
Another scheduling challenge relates to the availability of government pilots. Since most of the
helicopters built are going to the United States government, their pilots are required to perform a
government flight acceptance (GFA) before the aircraft sale can be finalized. Because FAFO is a satellite
location, government pilots are not permanently assigned to the facility. Instead, pilots come down each
month for a few days to perform the GFAs. Unfortunately, there is often not time for all available aircraft
to be flown by the government pilots. If the GFA is not completed on an aircraft, it cannot be sold and
must wait until the next scheduled visit by government pilots. Although final assembly and flight
operations may have worked hard to complete an aircraft on schedule, it can still be late to the customer
due to poor scheduling of pilots.
Carry-Forward Work
Challenges associated with parts, the hourly and salaried workforces, and scheduling lead to carry-
forward work. Carry-forward work is work that is not done in the assigned position but is instead
"carried forward" to the next position to be completed there. Pushing work forward to the next position
means that position now has to complete all of its assigned work plus whatever work has not yet been
completed but should have been. An example of the propagation of carry-forward work through the
production line is shown in Table 3.
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Table 3. Propagation of Carry-Forward Work
Assigned Carried Target to ActualForward Complete Completed
Position 6 100 -- 100 90
Position 5 100 10 110 90
Position 4 100 20 120 100
Position 3 100 20 120 95
Position 2 100 25 125 115
Position 1 100 10 110 110
Aircraft Total Build Days and Total Hours
Carry-forward work leads to overruns of target total build days and target total hours. The target total
build days is equal to N (the number of positions) times the takt time. In the examples given previously,
there were six positions with a takt time of six days for target total build days of 36. To meet this target,
the line must roll every six days. In reality, the line rolls when the first aircraft is completed. When there
is carry-forward work, it often takes longer than the takt time to finish all the installations. The aircraft
may roll a day or two later than scheduled, increasing the length of the takt. This increase affects all the
aircraft in the line because rarely do associates fall back and start working on the next aircraft. In fact, the
presence of carry-forward work assures that the back positions are behind as well.
The target total hours is the FAFO transfer cost (see Figures 7 and 8). If the target build days are being
exceeded, the target total hours will also be exceeded. This follows from having a constant number of
direct labor employees on the line. If target build days are exceeded by one day, there is a extra 8 hours
for each associate that needs to be allocated somewhere. Management exerts substantial pressure not to
charge indirect time (overhead) when not absolutely essential, so these extra hours will end up on the
aircraft. There are also other reasons for the target total hours to be exceeded, but most of them relate to
challenges already discussed. For example, part shortages sometimes cause employees to perform
workarounds to keep busy. When the part is available, a portion of the workaround installation is actually
removed or uninstalled, the late part installed, and the workaround installation done again. Since the
same work is being performed more than once, the aircraft hours will exceed the target. Another case of
work being performed more than once occurs when there is a discrepancy that has to be reworked. For
example, if a wire is nicked and has to be replaced, the installation of that wire will essentially be
performed twice, taking (at least) twice the amount of time and exceeding the target hours for the
installation.
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3.2 Critical Path Analysis Motivation
To combat these challenges, there are twice daily site-level and program-level production meetings. The
site-level meetings are held via teleconference with Stratford and the other SMS site. These meetings are
mainly status updates with the Vice President of Operations, and the site director, operations mangers,
line managers, and relevant support staff attend. Program-level meetings are run by the operations
manager and attended by the line managers, supervisors, and relevant support staff. These meetings are
in-depth status updates as well as an opportunity for the operations manager to pass down messages to his
production staff. Both sets of meetings are used more to fight fires on a daily basis than to move toward a
smoother mode of operation.
There is a great need for tools to aid in attacking the challenges described. A critical path analysis would
highlight where efforts should be made to achieve the greatest benefit. Instead of trying to improve
performance on every AOS, knowledge of the critical path will help management focus on the AOSs that
determine the overall build duration. In addition, the critical path analysis will illustrate a feasible
schedule and provide useful information to supervisors. Currently, many of the supervisors are
unfamiliar with the aircraft build and do not understand the interdependencies among AOSs. Since the
critical path analysis will record this information, which in the past has been tribal knowledge,
supervisors will be able to manage the build more effectively.
This chapter has described some of the challenges that the FAFO facility faces, particularly related to
parts, workforce, and scheduling. These challenges lead to carry-forward work which results in difficulty
achieving targeted total aircraft hours and total build days.
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4. Literature Review of Critical Path Method
This chapter provides an introduction to the Critical Path Method (CPM) and reviews the literature related
to it. Section 4.1 details the history and development of CPM for project management. Section 4.2
explains the methodology of CPM. Section 4.3 discusses some common applications of CPM.
4.1 History and Development
James E. Kelley, Jr. of Remington Rand UNIVAC and Morgan R. Walker of DuPont introduced CPM in
their submission to the 1959 Eastern Joint Computer Conference, "Critical-Path Planning and
Scheduling" (Weaver, 2007). They had been tasked with developing a computer-oriented system for
managing large and complex projects. CPM was the resulting tool which could plan and schedule a large
project with many interdependencies. The method took into consideration such factors as task
predecessors, duration, cost, and resources. CPM had been developed over the preceding couple of years
and had been tested on a few DuPont projects. The results were impressive; for example, the required
downtime in a plant maintenance schedule was reduced by over 25% by improving performance along the
critical path (Levy et al, 1963).
4.2 Methodology
CPM is most easily conveyed through a visual diagram of project tasks. As introduced by Kelley and
Walker, activities are depicted by arrows from node to node, and nodes are events or points in time at
which all activities leading to that node had been completed (Kelley, Jr. and Walker, 1959). The activity-
on-arrow depiction has a few drawbacks, the discussion of which are beyond the scope of this paper.
Levy et al describe another depiction method, activity-on-node (Levy et al, 1963). This method depicts
activities as nodes and the interdependencies between activities as arrows. All nodes with no
predecessors are linked to a Start node, and all nodes with no successors are linked to an End node. On
the following page, Figure 10 presents an example of a project graph using the activity-on-node
representation. The letter labels represent activity identifiers, and the numbers represent activity time
requirements or durations.
The critical path of a system such as the one in Figure 10 is the longest duration path through the system.
The duration of this path determines the overall duration of the project. Delays along the critical path will
delay the project. Delays to activities on non-critical paths will only delay the project if the delay
duration is large enough to shift the critical path. For example, in Figure 10, there are three paths:
- Path 1: Start 4 A + B 4 C + H + End; Duration = 24
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- Path 2: Start - A B + D + H + End; Duration =26
- Path 3: Start E 4 F + G + H -) End; Duration 27
Since Path 3 has the longest duration, it is the critical path and is highlighted in red. If any of the
activities on Path 3 (E, F, G, or H) are delayed, the project will be delayed. Now consider two additional
cases:
1)
2)
Activity A is delayed by time 0.5.
Activity A is delayed by time 2.
In case 1, the length of Path 1 becomes 24.5, and the length of Path 2 becomes 26.5. Path 3 is still the
critical path, so the delay of activity A has had no effect on the duration of the project. In case 2, the
length of Path a becomes 26, and the length of Path 2 becomes 28. The critical path has shifted, and now
Path 2 is the critical path. The delay of activity A has delayed the entire project.
Figure 10. Sample CPM Project Graph
The critical path algorithm does not just determine the critical path, it also schedules the activities. As
this thesis does not rely heavily upon the scheduling aspect of the algorithm, it will not be discussed here.
Explanations of the algorithm can be found in a variety of sources (Kelley, Jr. and Walker, 1959; Kelley,
Jr., 1961; Levy et al, 1963).
4.3 Applications
Even at the time of the introduction of CPM, it was identified as a method having many possible
applications. Kelley, Jr. and Walker discuss the use of CPM for construction and maintenance of
chemical plants and suggest its use in construction and maintenance of civil engineering projects,
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retooling programs for high volume production plants, and government contractor management (Kelley,
Jr. and Walker, 1959). The applications that Kelley, Jr. and Walker suggest are all unique, single-
occurrence projects. Levy et al note that its use can extend beyond this type of project management to
manufacturing applications, as well (Levy et al, 1963). Others have also suggested the extension of CPM
to manufacturing (Gupta, 1991) and discussed its application (Song et al, 2001; Suri, 2010), but extensive
literature on this subject is difficult to find. The author's personal anecdotal evidence suggests there are
manufacturing companies, specifically aerospace manufacturers, that have successfully used critical path
analysis to improve operations. Results of these applications are not public knowledge due to the
proprietary nature of the information and the desire to keep sources of competitive advantage in-house.
* * *
The Critical Path Method was originally developed in the late 1950s as a project management tool and
has been widely applied as such. In addition to scheduling tasks, the methodology identifies a critical
path, the duration of which determines the overall duration of the project. Improvement to critical path
tasks will improve the project length (at least, until the critical path shifts). Applications to
manufacturing are appropriate but extensive literature is not readily available on this subject. It is the
purpose of this thesis to provide an additional example of the application of CPM to manufacturing.
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5. Critical Path Analysis
Chapter 5 delves into the critical path analysis of one production line at the FAFO facility. There are
three key elements of the critical path analysis: predecessor relationships, duration data, and resource
allocation. Section 5.1 introduces the methodology for creating the database of installations and
collecting the predecessor information. Section 5.2 discusses the actual and target duration data and
explains which was used for the analysis. Section 5.3 discusses the allocation of resources and its effects
on the analysis. Section 5.4 presents the results of the critical path analysis. Note that DCMA processes
(see Section 2.3) were not considered for this analysis.
5.1 Predecessor Relationships
It was necessary to completely document every predecessor relationship for each installation. To compile
the predecessor relationships for the hundreds of installations in the aircraft build, the following
procedure was implemented:
1. Decompose aircraft build
2. Interview key personnel
3. Group installations
4. Map aircraft build
5. Create database
6. Incorporate QA processes
This procedure is detailed fully in the following subsections. In reality, steps two through five were first
completed for the AOSs in the last position and then iterated until all the positions were covered. After
the whole database was built, the QA processes were incorporated.
The system was modeled with all predecessor relationships being finish-to-start. This means that a
subsequent task could not be started until all of its predecessors were completed.
Decompose Aircraft Build
Decomposing the aircraft build into smaller segments allowed the project to become more manageable.
First, the aircraft build was decomposed by position, by skill or specialty required, and by shift. A
summary of the aircraft build decomposition is presented in Table 4. As mentioned in section 2.4, the
AOSs are assigned by position. For example, Mechanical Installs A, B, and C are scheduled to be
completed in Position 6 (using the aforementioned theoretical build schedule). Every AOS can also be
classified by skill or specialty required to perform the installation. The specialties are mechanics,
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electricians, plumbers (hydraulics specialist), electrical check-out technicians, and riggers. Electrical
check-out technicians perform the ATPs to verify proper functioning of the aircraft systems. Riggers
perform the "rigging" of the aircraft. This involves calibration and checking of all the flight control
systems.
Table 4. Decomposition of Aircraft Build by Skill and by Shift (based on target hours)
% of Total Build a% of Total Build
Mechanical 29%
Electrical 40%
Hydraulic 7%
Electrical Check-out 10%
Rig 4%
Shakes 10%
Total 1000/
1st Shift 45%
2nd Shift 35%
1st or 2nd Shift 17%
3rd Shift 3%
Total 100%
Every AOS is also assigned to a shift. These assignments detail a scope or statement of work (SOW) for
each position on each shift. Often, common sense has led to the shift assignments. For example, one
team of first shift electricians installs wiring in the tubs (belly) of the aircraft. Another team installs
wiring on the top deck of the aircraft. These teams can perform their work on the same shift, in the same
position because they are working in different areas of the aircraft. The overhead wiring is installed by a
team on second shift. Since the tub wiring and the overhead wiring both are in the cabin, there would not
be enough room for the two teams to perform these installations at the same time (on the same shift). In
this specific case, to work in the tubs, the temporary floors are removed, and the electricians lie on their
stomachs. To work in the overheads, however, the temporary floors must be installed, and the electricians
sit on stools and reach up into the overhead area. It is obvious that the tub wiring and overhead wiring
must be completed on different shifts.
In other cases, an AOS can be performed on either shift but has traditionally been completed on one
specific shift. In this way, employees on that particular shift have developed experience with the AOS.
Transferring the AOS to another shift would temporarily decrease performance due to unfamiliarity with
the AOS. Occasionally, employees do transfer among shifts, and their assigned AOSs could, in these
cases, transfer with them. Finally, there are some AOSs which are performed on either first or second
shift depending on availability or performed on both shifts. These include all rigging operations, some
mechanical installs at the front of the line, and the final assembly and hangar shakes.
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Interview Key Personnel
Once the build was decomposed, many interviews were conducted with supervisors, leads, and associates.
These interviews aimed to collect information about the order in which AOSs had to be performed. Until
this point, that information was mostly tribal knowledge. The assignment of AOSs to positions implies
some predecessor relationships, but the true predecessor relationships cannot easily be deduced from this
information. For example, take the Armored Wing Installs. The armored wings are sliding shields that
protect the pilots from enemy fire. Assume they are installed in Position 6. Is that because these
installations need to be done before any of the work in Position 5 is performed? Or were these AOSs thus
assigned to balance the number of associates working in each position? It turns out that the Armored
Wing Installs do not need to be performed this early in the build. In fact, if installed early in the build, the
armored wings impede other installations.
Group Installations
After completing the interviews, it was possible to group installations together to reduce complexity in
the system. Groups were created for two reasons. First, a group was created if the installations were
related, performed by the same person or people, and created a chain of predecessor relationships. For
example, the AOSs that install the wiring, shelves, and avionics in the aft transition section of the aircraft
were grouped together as shown in Figure 11. (The aft transition area is the aft section of the transition
area from the cabin to the tail cone.) The second reason to create groups was if installations were related,
performed by the same person or people, and had the same predecessors and successors. In this case, the
AOSs do not follow in a chain as in Figure 11. They are instead installations that could be performed in
parallel with the exception that the same person usually completes all of them. For example, there are
multiple cabin dome lights, and each has its own AOS. They have the same predecessor relationships
(namely, that the overhead wiring and clamping is completed) and have no successors. Usually, one
electrician completes all of these; thus, the AOSs could not be completed in parallel. Since the
installations are related, they were grouped together as Cabin Dome Lights.
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Figure 11. Grouping of Installations into Aft Transition Wiring & Shelves
Map Aircraft Build
Maps were created for each decomposition of the aircraft build to facilitate visualization of the network of
interdependencies. For the initial positions in the production line (for example, Position 6), it was
relatively easy to create these maps. At this stage, electrical installations are only dependent on other
electrical installations, and there are many installations with no dependencies at all. Partial build maps
are shown in Figure 12. As the build progresses, the interdependencies become more and more
important. Mechanical, electrical, and hydraulic installations become intertwined, and partial build maps
such as shown in Figure 12 fail to capture the real picture. Unfortunately, as the number of installations
involved grows, an overall build map becomes too large and cumbersome to present in a useful format.
Even when the database of installations was imported into Microsoft Project, the resulting diagram was
too complex to properly present with available software support. Due to this effect, the effort to create a
visual tool was not pursued.
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Figure 12. Hydraulic, Electrical, and Mechanical Partial Build Maps
Create Database
Table 5 shows a sample of the Excel database created with the predecessor information. Column
descriptions are described as follows:
- ID - Unique number assigned to task or summary task
+/- Identifies first- and second-level tasks (see accompanying description in text)
* FAFO Pos. - Position to which the AOS is assigned at FAFO
- Position - Position to which the AOS is assigned at Stratford and in internal computer system
e Part No. - AOS part number for Sikorsky internal computer system
- Description - Name of task or summary task
- Skill - Skill or specialty required to complete AOS
- Shift - Shift to which the AOS is assigned
Predecessors - IDs of predecessors for that task or summary task
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Table 5. Sample Database Entries
ID FAFO Pos. Position Part No. Description Skill Shift Predecessors
241 + FAFO x x 70000-xxxxx-xxx LH STRUT - ENGINE INSTL. M 1 F257,258
242 + FAFO x x 70000-xxxxx-xxx RH STRUT - ENGINE INSTL. M 1 "257,258
243 + FAFO x x 70000-xxxxx-xxx XMSN/RTR/BRK M 2 229,82
244 + FAFO x x 70204-xxxxx-xxx AFT FLOOR INSTL M 1 56,60
245 + Engine Drip Pan Fairings 4
246 - FAFO x x 70207-xxxxx-xxx CARGO DOOR SEAL L/H M 1
247 - FAFO x x 70302-xxxxx-xxx FAIRING INSTL M 1 "246
248 - FAFO x x 70207-xxxxx-xxx CARGO DOOR SEAL R/H M 1 "247
249 - FAFO x x 70302-xxxxx-xxx FAIRING ENG INLET M 1 "248
250 + FAFO x x 70212-xxxxx-xxx BEAM INSTL M 2 "251
251 + FAFO x x 70219-xxxxx-xxx OIL COOLER SPT M 1
252 + FAFO x x 70219-xxxxx-xxx FAIRING & DUCT INSTL M 2 "272
253 + Brackets - Oil Cooler Support 251
254 - FAFO x x 70221-xxxxx-xxx BRACKET ASSY M 2
255 - FAFO x x 70221-xxxxx-xxx INSTALL, BRACKET M 2 "254
256 + FAFO x x 70232-xxxxx-xxx LOUVER INSTL E 2
257 + FAFO x x 70301-xxxxx-xxx CONTROL INST (L.D.S. Cables) M 1
258 + Shield Installs "243
259 - FAFO x x 70302-xxxxx-xxx SHIELD INSTL. M 2
260 - FAFO x x 70302-xxxxx-xxx SHIELD INSTL M 2 "59
261 + FAFO x x 70303-xxxxx-xxx MOUNT INSTL M 1
262 + FAFO x x 70303-xxxxx-xxx SUNDSTRAND APU M 1 "261,272,335,438
263 + FAFO x x 70303-xxxxx-xxx APU INSTL-HYD H 2 "262
264 + ESSS Lines Install 21
265 - FAFO x x 70307-xxxxx-xxx LINES INSTALL INSTL A H 2
266 - FAFO x x 70307-xxxxx-xxx LINES INSTALL INSTL B H 2 "65
267 - FAFO x x 70307-xxxxx-xxx LINES INSTALL INSTL C H 2 "266
268 + Fire Ext & Lines 22
269 - FAFO x x 70310-xxxxx-xxx FIRE EXT SYS H 1
270 - FAFO x x 70310-xxxxx-xxx FIRE LINE INSTL H 1 "269
271 + FAFO x x 70350-xxxxx-xxx DRIVE SHAFT INSTL (No. 3 - 6) M 1 "272,547
272 + FAFO x x 70350-xxxxx-xxx OIL COOLER INSTL M 1 1 78 ,24 1,24 2,26 8 ,25 1
273 + FAFO x x 70400-xxxxx-xxx CONTROL INST (Fwd & Aft Bridge) M 1 "43
To further explain the database excerpt presented in Table 5, take Task 253, Brackets - Oil Cooler
Support. This task is first-level task because it is denoted by a "+." (A first-level task either is a stand
alone AOS or a summary task that groups together AOSs performed in an uninterrupted sequence.) It is
also a summary task because it contains two sub-tasks, each denoted by a "-." Since Task 253 is a
summary task, it does not correspond to an AOS; therefore, it does not have a FAFO Position, Position,
Part Number, Skill, or Shift assigned to it. Task 253 does have a predecessor: Task 251 (Oil Cooler
Support). This means that Task 251 must be completed before Task 253 can begin. The summary task
has no duration; it is only a grouping mechanism to simplify the build by aggregating certain installations.
When imported into Microsoft Project, the database can be collapsed such that only the first-level tasks
are shown. The sub-tasks of Task 253 are performed in series, as can be determined from studying their
predecessors. Task 254 precedes Task 255. Mechanics (denoted "M") on second shift perform both
Tasks 254 and 255.
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For a second example, take Task 243 in Table 5. This is the installation of the transmission
(XMSN/RTR/BRK). It is a first-level task because it is denoted by a "+." It is not a summary task
because it does not contain any sub-tasks. A second-shift mechanic performs the installation. It has two
predecessors: Tasks 229 and 82.
The duration data was also included in this database; details on the collection and manipulation of that
data is described in Section 5.2.
Incorporate QA Processes
Once the database was created and imported into Microsoft Project, the applicable quality processes were
incorporated. This incorporation was delayed so that two different Project files could be analyzed: one
without QA processes and one with QA processes. Currently, Sikorsky does not take the impact of QA
processes into consideration when creating the build schedule. Only the manufacturing processes are
considered. It was desirable to see if adding QA processes would provide additional insight.
As discussed in section 2.3, each AOS includes QA operations or processes. In the model created for this
project, it is assumed that the QA processes stand alone and follow each AOS directly. As will be
discussed in section 5.2, the manufacturing and QA duration data are gathered separately on the shop
floor, supporting this assumption.
There are two types of relationships between QA processes and the installations themselves. The first is
when there is a group of installations performed in series that form a link of predecessors. Here, the QA
process is inserted after each AOS, and the QA process must be completed before the next AOS can
begin. The second relationship occurs when one person performs a group of installations in a series that
do not form a link of predecessors. The installations are performed in series only because the same
person is responsible for all of them. Examples of both relationships are presented in Table 6 which
shows the AOSs related to the installation of the catwalk fairings. Task 20 is a summary task with no
predecessors, and it is comprised of Tasks 21 through 28. Tasks 21 and 22 are the installation of the left-
hand fairing and the associated QA process. Task 21 is the predecessor of Task 22 because the
installation must be completed before it can be inspected. Note, however, that Task 21 is also the
predecessor of Task 23. Once Task 21 is completed, Task 23 can begin. Task 23 relates to the catwalk
fairings on the right-hand side of the aircraft, thus work can begin before the left-hand side catwalk
fairing is inspected. This is an example of the second relationship described. The remaining installations
and QA processes (Tasks 23 through 28) are examples of the first relationship described. They form a
predecessor chain, so Task 23 must be inspected (Task 24) before Task 25 can begin and so on.
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Table 6. Sample Database Entries with QA Processes
ID FAFO Pos. Position Part No. Description Skill Shift Predecessors
20 + Catwalk Fairings
21 - FAFO x x 70217-xxxxx-xxx L/H FAIRING INST M 1
22 QA - L/H Fairing Inst 21
23 - FAFO x x 70217-xxxxx-xxx FAIRING GROUNDING INSTL M 1 21
24 QA - Fairing Grounding Instl 23
25 - FAFO x x 70217-xxxxx-xxx FRG INSTL,RH STA 308-353 M 1 24
26 QA - Frg Insti, RH STA 308-353 25
27 - FAFO x x 70217-xxxxx-xxx COVER INST M 1 26
28 QA - Cover Inst 27
Note that inserting QA processes will change the unique IDs of each task. Microsoft Project will
automatically update the predecessors to keep the appropriate links intact. This is another reason that the
QA processes were added after the database was imported into Project.
5.2 Duration Data
The next set of data needed to perform a critical path analysis is the duration data. These data were not
difficult to acquire, but it was difficult deciding which data to use. Sikorsky records and stores the actual
manufacturing time it takes to complete each installation. As mentioned in section 3.1, there are also
target manufacturing hours for each AOS. After collecting both sets of data (actual and target hours), it
was decided to perform the critical path analysis with the target data. Reasons for this will be explained
in the following subsections. For QA, the actual data is also recorded and stored, but there are no QA
targets. Equivalent QA target hours were calculated based on the actual data. The process is described in
the following subsections.
Target Manufacturing Data
The target hours for each AOS were compiled. The standard, or Stratford, target hours were used in this
compilation. Due to complaints that had been voiced about the appropriateness of some of the targets,
supervisors and leads were asked to provide their input. Each supervisor and lead was given a list of the
AOSs assigned to his position and the associated target hours. Each was invited to "correct" the target
hours as he saw fit based on his experience. Was the target achievable? Was it too low? Or was the
target too high? Did it provide more time than was necessary to complete the AOS? The supervisors and
leads were instructed not to review the actual data but instead to rely on their sense of the process. This
activity provided some useful insight. Despite general complaints about the targets, the supervisors and
leads validated most of the targets. A few of the targets were increased, but a few of the targets were
lowered. Also, recall that the standard hours, not the adjusted FAFO hours, were used.
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Actual Manufacturing Data
The actual manufacturing data for every AOS was extracted from Sikorsky's internal production
management tool and compiled for 14 previous aircraft. Means were calculated for each AOS, and at first
glance, these seemed to be the appropriate data to use. Upon closer investigation, significant variability
was present in the data (see Figure 13). Table 7 presents a sample of the data with the mean, standard
deviation, and coefficient of variation calculated. The first AOS shown in this table has actual duration
values ranging from 0.10 hour to 8.60 hours. While some variation from aircraft to aircraft was expected,
the observed levels of variation were concerning.
Variations in actual manufacturing duration data for a single AOS have four possible causes. First,
different people with varying proficiency levels may have performed the installation on different aircraft.
Second, manufacturing engineers may have changed some of the operations in the AOS; however, major
changes would most likely necessitate the creation of a new AOS. Third, the number of discrepancies
created, reworks required, and removals performed for a specific AOS varies from aircraft to aircraft.
Finally, it is possible that the installer logged his time incorrectly. The first three reasons are not
sufficient to cause levels of variation such as those shown in Table 7. Incorrectly laboring
("mislaboring") also plays a significant role.
Mislaboring has a few causes. First, it is possible that the employee forgot to labor off an AOS before
moving to the next one. The added pressure from trying to catch up with the schedule might increase the
likelihood of this reason. The root cause behind forgetting is that correctly logging labor hours has not
been sufficiently stressed to employees. It is not part of the culture. The second reason for mislaboring
also stems from a weak laboring culture. There is constant pressure on employees not to charge their time
as indirect (i.e. to overhead) to avoid going over the indirect budget. Although management does support
charging indirect when it is warranted, the message is not communicated clearly enough. Employees
hear, "Don't charge indirect," and think they need to hide hours on the aircraft when doing things like
training, cleaning the work area, and moving the helicopters. A third reason for mislaboring was
described in section 3.1: employees are working multiple AOSs at the same time. When the employee
goes to clock his time, the system assigns all of his time to the first AOS he inputs. He waits a few
minutes and then labors off another AOS, resulting in actual manufacturing time of 0.1 hr, for example.
Mislaboring also occurs when an employee is just trying to hide his hours. He may be working slower
than he is capable, he may be charging time to another shift's AOS, or he may be charging time to the top
collector. (The top collector is the overarching AOS for a position. It is a catch-all for many operations
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and tends to rack up hours quickly. It is hard to determine if someone is legitimately working a top
collector operation or not due to many reworks charged there.)
Due to the lack of confidence in the actual manufacturing data's integrity, the target manufacturing data
was used for the critical path analysis.
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Figure 13. Distribution of Coefficients of Variation for Actual Manufacturing Duration Data
Table 7. Sample Actual Manufacturing Duration Data
Part Number AC 1 AC2 AC3 AC4 AC5 AC6 AC7 AC8 AC9 AC10 AC11 AC12 AC13 AC14 Mean Standard Coeff of
Deviation Variation
70550-xxxxx-xxx 1.12 0.77 0.10 1.07 1.22 7.77 0.72 0.30 4.43 8.60 1.05 4.96 1.73 3.45 2.66 2.78 1.04
70212-xxxxx-xxx 5.28 4.36 2.70 10.14 20.41 31.64 6.89 2.71 2.62 6.69 19.04 5.70 788 4.72 9.34 8.50 0.91
70600-xxxxx-xxx 2.23 2.18 2.86 4.83 4.86 2.10 3.15 3.28 20.38 2.90 0.10 2.84 1.20 4.22 4.08 4.87 1.19
70550-xxxxx-xxx 9.43 2.83 2.24 5.17 3.95 24.94 3.62 7.87 2.37 14.43 3.22 4.45 4.35 0.80 6.41 6.39 1.00
QA Data
As with the manufacturing data, the actual QA data was easily extracted and compiled. Upon
examination, these data also contained high levels of variability. Unfortunately, no target QA durations
exist on the individual AOS level. There is a target for the total QA hours on an aircraft; it is around 20%
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of the aircraft transfer cost. A straightforward way to estimate target QA durations would be to apply this
percentage to every AOS' target manufacturing duration. In reality, the amount of QA time needed per
AOS varies. For example, an AOS which logs wire harness serial numbers into a database will have
relatively fewer QA processes than an AOS which defines some critical characteristics of the aircraft. To
better represent reality, a ratio of actual duration averages was taken (actual average QA duration/actual
average manufacturing duration) and then multiplied by the target manufacturing duration to give an
equivalent target QA duration for each AOS. Two example calculations are presented in Table 8. Table
8 also illustrates the range of actual QA to Mfg duration ratios.
Table 8. Calculation Example of Equivalent Target QA Duration
AOS Description Mfg Avg (hr) QA Avg (hr) QA/Mfg Mfg Target (hr) Equiv QA Target
__________________ ___________(hr)
W/I PHBK TRANS RH 82.3 9.60 11.7% 59.0 6.88
BROMCLST FLT CONT RODS 19.7 10.62 54.0% 16.0 8.64
Total 101.9 20.22 19.8% -- --
5.3 Resource Allocation
To correctly schedule tasks performed by the same person, it was necessary to allocate resources in
Microsoft Project. One method of resource allocation would be to identify each resource's capabilities
and allocate accordingly. This would require cataloguing which installations each of hundreds of workers
can perform. This method also ignores potential flexibility achieved through cross-training. It was
determined that more insight could be achieved by following a second method of resource allocation.
In the second method, resource pools were created and assigned to installations. The following might be
some of the resource pools utilized in a six-position build:
" Position 6 Mechanics, 1st shift
- Position 6 Mechanics, 2nd shift
* Position 6 Electricians, 1st shift
" Position 6 Electricians, 2nd shift
* Position 6 Plumbers, 1st shift
- Position 6 Plumbers, 2nd shift
Since the installations were already categorized by position, skill, and shift, it was straightforward to
assign the appropriate resource pools to the installations. To determine the size of each resource pool,
some software experimentation and back-of-the-envelope calculations were performed. Microsoft Project
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contains a workload balancing tool which introduces delays on non-critical paths in order to balance work
across a resource pool. For example, instead of needing 5 mechanics on Day I and I mechanic on Day 2,
the program would try to balance the workload by delaying some of the tasks from Day 1, if possible.
Ideally, this would result in 3 mechanics needed both on Day I and on Day 2. Note the workload
balancing algorithm becomes more complicated when Day 2 tasks depend on Day I tasks.
5.4 Results
The results of the critical path analysis included the identification of a critical path for each of the build
positions, allowing key observations to be made regarding the final assembly process. In some positions,
the theoretical critical path was also observed as causing delays in the build process. In other positions,
the theoretical critical path was not causing delays in the build process; the duration of other paths had
been lengthened due to poor performance to target AOS hours. For example, a position near the
beginning of the build had a critical path comprised of the chain of overhead wiring installations. In
reality, due to the abundance of electricians and their effective management of the tasks, this path did not
cause delays in practice. The poor performance of the plumbers caused the observed delays at this
position. The value from the theoretical critical path in this example is that it highlights the excellent
performance of the electricians and emphasizes just how much the plumbers' performance is hurting the
build process.
Another key observation involves the riggers. After balancing resources, the appropriate number of two-
person rigging teams was calculated. The number of teams that are needed to complete the work on
schedule is the same as the number of teams currently working on this production line. Generally, rigging
has not been the cause of delays to the build process, and the critical path analysis validates those results.
Additional general observations were made during the critical path analysis process. First, there were
quite a few AOSs out of sequence. This means some AOSs were assigned to positions that preceded a
position containing some of their predecessors. For example, say Hydraulic Install A was a predecessor
to Electrical Install A. In some cases it was found that Hydraulic Install A would be assigned to position
3, but Electrical Install A would be assigned to position 4. Thus it was impossible to complete Electrical
Install A in position 4 because not all of its predecessors were complete. Electrical Install A could not be
completed until position 3. In order for the software to correctly model the critical path of each position,
there could be no out-of-sequence tasks. Some tasks were reassigned to later positions to overcome this
problem. For example, in the case presented above, Electrical Install A would be reassigned to position 3.
In practice, this AOS would not be completed until position 3 anyway because it would have to wait until
all predecessor tasks were completed.
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The second observation centered around the imbalance of the work. In most positions, there was an
obvious critical path because one path was significantly longer in duration than the others. Unfortunately,
this creates an imbalance in the work. When the other paths have been completed but the critical path
work is still in process, there are many idle resources. Unfortunately, since these resources are people,
their time must be counted toward an aircraft build or toward indirect overhead. Even if they do not have
tasks to perform, these employees must still be paid. The company sees this as inflated AOS and aircraft
build hours or as over-budget overhead.
A final observation came from comparisons between the critical paths without QA processes and with QA
processes. The inclusion of QA processes did not alter the position critical paths, but it did increase the
critical path lengths by over 35%, on average. This is a significant increase in path duration and extends
the position critical paths beyond the target takt time. Inclusion of QA processes is not an optional part of
the build; the QA processes included are a required part of the aircraft build. In the current planning and
scheduling methodology, QA processes are ignored. Without modeling and accounting for the entire
build process, including QA, it is impossible to create a schedule that can be achieved.
This chapter described the approach used for the critical path analysis as well as its results. The approach
consisted of documenting the predecessor relationships, compiling the duration data, and appropriately
allocating resources to the tasks. The results of the analysis indicate that the current build schedule is not
optimized and should be revisited with these results in mind.
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6. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter 6 concludes this report with conclusions and recommendations based on the critical path analysis
and observations made during the internship. Section 6.1 draws conclusions based on the results
presented in chapter 5. Section 6.2 make managerial recommendations based on six months of
observations of the FAFO operations. Section 6.3 suggests some opportunities for further study.
6.1 Critical Path Analysis Conclusions
Three conclusions can be drawn from the results of the critical path analysis. All three were alluded to in
section 5.4. First, AOSs need to be reassigned to positions keeping predecessor relationships in mind. As
discussed in section 2.4, the assignment of AOSs to positions was based on past industrial engineering
studies. From time to time, AOSs were reassigned to new positions to target improved performance.
Despite attempts to optimize the build process through assignment of AOSs to the appropriate positions,
the lack of a thorough understanding of the predecessor relationships prohibits true optimization. With
out-of-sequence AOSs, it is impossible for the build to proceed as scheduled. Some installations will be
necessarily delayed while predecessor installations are completed. Continuing with this work schedule
sets the team up for failure. In addition, it becomes difficult to determine when the build is progressing
appropriately and when there are delays since the schedule to which performance is being measured is not
achievable. The assignment of AOSs to position must be revisited now that all predecessor relationships
have been documented.
Second, QA processes must be included in work schedules. Creating a build schedule which ignores the
QA function is another way to set up the team for failure. The inclusion of the QA processes significantly
increases the critical path duration. As stated in section 5.4, these QA functions are absolutely essential to
the build process, so it is unrealistic to overlook them in the planning process. Updated balance charts
should be created that account for QA processes in their schedule. Creating these balance charts will
allow the build process to be better understood and will allow improvements to be made.
In addition to correcting out-of-sequence work and including QA processes in schedules, assignment of
all AOSs to positions should be reconsidered. As discussed in section 5.4, the build process remains
unbalanced across different predecessor chains, leading to idle resources. Since these resources are
people, their idle hours increase AOS and aircraft hours or eat into the overhead budget. The system must
be balanced to maximize resource utilization.
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6.2 Managerial Recommendations
Based on six months of observations of FAFO operations, four general managerial recommendations can
be made:
- Introduce a labor-on clock system
* Automate daily IE reports and align IE interests with facility performance
" Hold status meetings on the shop floor
- Increase supervisor engagement
As discussed in section 5.2, there are many reasons for the mislaboring that was observed. After
discussions with various stakeholders, it is recommended to introduce a labor-on clock system to track
labor hours. Currently, Sikorsky uses a labor-off clock system. Employees only enter work into the
system once it is completed or when they switch tasks. For example, at the beginning of the day, Jesse
scans his ID badge to report to work. He then proceeds to work on an installation. When he has
completed his work on that installation for the present, he "labors off" the installation. Up until this point,
there was no record of which installation Jesse was working on. Close observation of Jesse's work during
this period is the only way a supervisor could tell what he was doing. There is no real-time monitoring
capability in the software as it is currently utilized. Consequently, corrections to labor charges cannot be
made until the following day. A labor-on clock system would allow for real-time monitoring of employee
performance. It would also create a better mental model for employees to follow. Instead of falling into
some of the mislaboring traps discussed in section 5.2, the employees would more clearly understand that
each segment of time must correspond to work performed on only one installation. Most importantly, a
labor-on clock system and strong emphasis on good laboring practices would improve the data quality of
actual manufacturing and QA hours. Improved data quality would allow management to make better
informed decisions and become more data-driven.
There is insufficient IE support at FAFO to drive process improvements. IE resources spend countless
hours a day pulling data from the production database and manipulating these data in various Excel
spreadsheets. These data are presented in an array of required reports. The reports are standardized
across all sites and production lines. Unfortunately, very few of the reports are used at FAFO. The
generation of these standard reports should be automated through investment in a software solution.
Also, the reports should be stored on a server and accessed in an online format as opposed to
complicating the system by having too many Excel files floating around. Instead of focusing on report
generation, the IE resources should be focused on industrial engineering analysis of the build process and
identification of improvement opportunities. Currently, this analysis falls on supervisors. Part of the
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problem here is the misalignment of incentives for lEs. They report to supervisors in Stratford and have
performance metrics based on completion of daily standard reports. To effectively engage the lEs, the
dotted-line reporting to facility management should be highlighted through a revised incentive structure.
Part of lE performance reviews should be based on the performance of a specific production line or of the
facility as a whole. Aligning incentives in this way will motivate lEs to demand automated standard
reports and more time for process analysis and improvements.
To tackle daily production challenges, the operations manager holds daily production meetings with
supervisors, line managers, and support staff. Currently, these meetings are held in a small conference
room located off the main production line. The meetings are twice daily for thirty minutes to an hour.
During the meetings, the floor is empty of all management supervision. In addition to the daily status
meetings, there are other daily and weekly meetings with mandatory supervisor attendance. Removing
supervisors from the floor for extended periods of time allows for lulls in production. Daily status
meetings need to be held on the production floor to keep supervisors engaged with the workforce and
aircraft build. FAFO should implement a "boardwalk" system, where the meeting moves from position to
position to receive the status updates. In addition, status meetings are currently comprised of a report of
the number of AOSs outstanding on each helicopter on the production line but do not include the
performance of the line to a schedule. The structure of each supervisor's report must be updated to
include information such as how many tasks were scheduled to be completed, which of those tasks were
completed and which weren't, and for those that were not completed, what were the system constraints
that prevented their completion.
Finally, supervisor engagement must be increased. Most supervisors do not feel directly responsible for
the performance of the facility. Many supervisors are discontented with their positions and are searching
for new jobs. Supervisors must be held accountable for the performance of their positions, but they also
must be empowered to initiate change and improve the build process.
When aiming to improve operations, it is necessary to choose projects wisely and then sustain them until
results can be observed. Currently, many small changes are introduced and then promptly forgotten. This
behavior was observed countless times during the internship. When changes are introduced and not
supported, enforced, or sustained, it sends the message to the employees that the changes are not critical
or important to operations. This behavior also undermines faith in future changes. Management must
identify select opportunities for improvement and then follow through with implementation and
sustainment.
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6.3 Future Opportunities
There are three opportunities for future work stemming from this project's results and the managerial
recommendations noted above. First, the labor-on clock system, which should be implemented company-
wide, could be piloted at FAFO. This would require a dedicated team to help with the transition from the
current system to the new system. (It should be noted that the current software used for recording labor
hours can be configured to support a labor-on system.) This project would need to be run for a sufficient
length of time to allow for workers to become familiar with the system. Part of the project would involve
emphasizing the value of properly laboring. Another facet would involve highlighting the value of
improved data quality to the organization.
A second opportunity for future work lies in the detailed analysis of actual AOS manufacturing and QA
hours. The critical path analysis based on target hours that was completed as part of this internship
provides a solid base from which to probe the actual hours. Comparisons between the current and target
states and between different facilities could be made. Related to this proposed project is a third
opportunity which involves the decomposition of the major electrical ATP AOS into multiple AOSs.
Currently, the major electrical ATP AOS is comprised of many individual ATPs, each which take a few
hours. There are predecessor relationships among these ATPs, and these relationships were documented
as part of the critical path analysis. Because all of these ATPs are part of one AOS, the time spent on
each ATP cannot be broken out. It is very difficult to monitor performance and improve the build process
when the actual hours for four dozen ATPs are amassed into one AOS. The decomposition of the major
electrical ATP AOS will aid in the detailed analysis of actual manufacturing and QA hours.
This chapter concludes the report by drawing conclusions from the analysis presented earlier. Sikorsky's
FAFO facility has been under increasing pressure as aircraft deliveries grow and target aircraft hours and
target build days decline. The facility has improved its performance when faced with these challenges,
but many fires are still being put out on a daily basis. In order to move to higher levels of performance,
the facility should take advantage of several improvement opportunities discussed in this report. When
appropriately implemented and sustained, these opportunities should lead to a more controlled process
overseen by proactive management.
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